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Articles

FEDERALIST NO. 78 AND BRUTUS'
NEGLECTED THESIS ON JUDICIAL
SUPREMACY
Shlomo Slonim*
Just three years ago the United States marked the bicentennial of Marbury v. Madison, the celebrated case that established
the principle of judicial review in 1803. The novelty of a court asserting authority to declare laws unconstitutional was labelled by
the noted historian Charles Beard as "the most unique contribution to the science of government which has been made by
American political genius. " 1 The occasion of the anniversary
prompted a considerable outpouring of scholarly articles on the
2
subject of judicial review, many of them focusing on the ques* LL.B. (Melbourne), Ph.D. (Columbia), James G. McDonald Professor, Emeritus, of American History, Hebrew University of Jerusalem.
This article had its origin in a paper I delivered at a 2003 conference on Marbury v.
Madison, sponsored by the University of London's Institute of United States Studies. I
am grateful to the then-Director of the Institute, Gary L. McDowell, for the opportunity
afforded me on that occasion for a keen discussion of the Brutus thesis.
1. CHARLES BEARD, AN ECONOMIC INTERPRETATION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF
THE UNITED STATES 162 (The Macmillan Co. 1956) (1913). In the words of Alexander
Bickel, thanks to judicial review, "[t]he least dangerous branch of the American government is the most extraordinarily powerful court of law the world has ever known."
ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT
THE BAR OF POLITICS 1 (1962).
2. Without any attempt to present an exhaustive list of such articles, see, for example, Christopher L. Eisgruber, Marbury v. Madison: A Bicentennial Symposium, 89
VA. L. REV. 1203 (2003); Davison M. Douglas, Judicial Review: Blessing or Curse? Or
Both? A Symposium in Commemoration of the Bicentennial of Marbury v. Madison, 38
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 375 (2003); Jack N. Rakove, The Origins of Judicial Review: A
Plea for New Contexts, 49 STAN. L. REV. 1031 (1997); Theodore B. Olson, Remembering
Marbury v. Madison, 7 GREEN BAG 35 (2003); Linda Greenhouse, Because We Are Final: Judicial Review Two Hundred Years After Marbury, 56 SMU L. REV. 781 (2003);
Richard A. Fallon, Marbury and the Constitutional Mind: A Bicentennial Essay on the
Wages of Doctrinal Tension, 91 CAL. L. REV. 1 \2003); Theodore W. Ruger, A Question
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tion whether the Rehnquist Court had not strayed from the generally accepted parameters of judicial review as recognized by
the Court since the late nineteen-thirties. 3
It is noteworthy that whenever Marbury v. Madison is discussed in works on constitutional law, text books or case books,
reference is invariably made to Alexander Hamilton's discussion
of judicial review in Federalist No. 78 as an early indication that
the principle was regarded as a fundamental part of the system
4
of government set up under the Constitution. Surprisingly, these
Which Convulses a Nation: The Early Republic's Greatest Debate About the Judicial Review Power, 117 HARV. L. REV. 826 (2004); Symposium, The Rehnquist Court, 99 NW.U.
L. REV. 1 (2004); Harry F. Tepker, Marbury's Legacy After Two Centuries, 57 OKLA. L.
REv. 127 (2004); Symposium, Locating the Constitutional Center-Centrist Judges and
Mainstream Values: A Multidisciplinary Exploration, 83 N.C. L. REV. 1089 (2005); Symposium, Theories of Taking the Constitution Seriously Outside the Courts, 73 FORDHAM
L. REV. 1341 (2005); Robert J. Reinstein, Reconstructing Marbury, 57 ARK. L. REV. 729
(2005); Sanford Levinson, Why I Do Not Teach Marbury (Except to Eastern Europeans)
and Why You Shouldn't Either," 38 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 553 (2003); Eric J. Segall,
Why I Still Teach Marbury (And So Should You): A Response to Professor Levinson, 6
U. PA. J. CONST. L 573 (2004); Sanford Levinson, Why I Still Won't Teach Marbury (Except in a Seminar), id., 588; Barry Friedman, The Politics of Judicial Review, 84 TEX. L.
REV. 257 (2005); Richard Fallon, Legitimacy and the Constitution, 118 HARV. L. REV.
1787 (2005); Symposium, Marbury at 200: A Bicentennial Celebration of Marbury v.
Madison, 20 CONST. COMMENT. 1 (2003); Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Irrepressible Myth
of Marbury, 101 MICH. L. REV. 2706 (2003).
3. See, e.g., Larry D. Kramer, Putting the Politics Back into the Political Safeguards
of Federalism, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 215 (2000); Kramer, Foreword: We the Court, 115
HARV. L. REV. 4 (2001); LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR
CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW (2004); MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE
CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS, passim (1999); Ruth Colker and James J.
Brudney, Dissing Congress, 100 MICH. L. REV. 80 (2003); Steven H. Goldberg, Putting
the Supreme Court Back in Place: Ideology Yes; Agenda No, 17 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS
175 (2004); ROBERT H. BORK, SLOUCHING TOWARDS GOMORRAH: MODERN
LIBERALISM AND AMERICAN DECLINE (1996). Judge Bork goes so far as to propose the
adoption of a constitutional amendment to enable Congress to formally override decisions of the courts.
Needless to say, various scholars have rallied to the defense of the Court and of the
institution of judicial review generally. Prominent among them are John C. Yoo, The Judicial Safeguards of Federalism, 70 S. CAL . L. REV. 1311 (1997); Saikrishna B. Prakash
and John C. Yoo, The Puzzling Persistence of Process-Based Federalism Theories, 79
TEX. L. REV. 1459 (2001); Prakash and Yoo, The Origins of Judicial Review, 70 U. CHI.
L. REV. 887 (2003). See also, in support of the Court's rulings, Lynn A Baker and Ernest
A Young, Federalism and the Double Standard of Judicial Review, 51 DUKE L.J. 75
(2001); Steven A Calabresi, 'A Government of Limited and Enumerated Powers': In Defense of United States v. Lopez, 94 MICH. L. REV. 752 (1995); Randy E. Barnett, The
Original Meaning of the Judicial Power (Boston University School of Law, Working Pa·
per No. 03-18, 2004).
4. According to one authority, "Federalist No. 78 is second only to Marshall's
Marbury opinion as the classic utterance on the subject" of judicial review. Leonard W.
Levy, Judicial Review, History, and Democracy: An Introduction, in JUDICIAL REVIEW
AND THE SUPREME COURT 6 (Leonard W. Levy ed., 1967). And in the words of another
writer, "Hamilton, more than any other single man, is the author of judicial review as the
nineteenth century was to know it." BENJAMIN F. WRIGHT, THE GROWTH OF
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works, almost without exception, fail to refer to the Antifederalist Letters of Brutus to which this number of the Federalist Papers constitutes a response. 5 This is a regrettable omission since
No. 78 cannot be properly understood except in the context of
Brutus' charge that the Constitution provided, not only for judicial review, but for judicial supremacy. 6 Federalist No. 78 (and
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 23 (Univ. of Chicago Press 1967) (1942).
5. In examining some twenty case and text books, I found only one that referred
to the essays of Brutus: ALPHEUS THOMAS MASON AND WILLIAM M. BEANEY,
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: INTRODUCTORY ESSAYS AND SELECTED CASES
32-35 (6th ed. 1978). In contrast, a classic work on judicial review, CHARLES GROVE
HAINES, THE AMERICAN DOCTRINE OF JUDICIAL SUPREMACY (2d ed. 1932), while it
analyzes Federalist No. 78 extensively, does not contain a single reference to Brutus in
the index. The same holds true for SYLVIA SNOWISS, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE LAW
OF THE CONSTITUTION (1990). Even law reviews, which have a better record than casebooks or textbooks in noting Brutus, generally fail to appreciate the direct significance of
Brutus' thesis for discussion of the subject of judicial supremacy. (One exception is Professor Michael Stokes Paulsen, whose work I discuss presently. See infra note 6.) Contrary to the common conception reflected in the various works, No. 78 was not the result
of some spontaneous inspiration on Hamilton's part to endorse judicial review.
6. The first to note that Federalist No. 78 was prompted by Brutus' essays on the
judiciary was Edward S. Corwin, in his celebrated work written during FDR's conflict
with the Court over the New Deal, EDWARDS. CORWIN, COURT OVER CONSTITUTION:
A STUDY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW AS AN INSTRUMENT OF POPULAR GOVERNMENT (1938).
In an appendix, Corwin published three of Brutus' essays on the judiciary (Nos. 11, 12,
15). In the Preface to the book, he writes: "I would urge the reader to give some attention to the Appendix, for the 'Letters of Brutus' there given comprise the most thorough
examination that was made prior to the Constitution's adoption of the power of the Supreme Court in interpreting it-an examination, moreover, which inspired Hamilton's
!lluch better known but less elaborate discussion of the subject in the Federalist." /d. at
Ill.

Despite the prominence which Corwin gave to Brutus' essays, there was very little
sequel. It would appear that, in sum, only two articles focusing on Brutus have appeared
in the interval that has elapsed since the Corwin work was published. One, the first complete edition of Brutus' essays, accompanied by a 20-page introduction: William Jeffrey
Jr., The Letters of Brutus: A Neglected Element in the Ratification Campaign of 1787-88,
40 U. CIN. L. REV. 643-777 (1971). The second was an incisive analysis by Ann Diamond,
The Anti-Federalist 'Brutus,' 6 POL. SCI. REv. 249--81 (1976). With the publication of 2
STORING, THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST (Herbert J. Storing ed., 1981), the text,
with commentary and notes became readily available to researchers. (All citations to
Brutus in the present article refer to the Storing edition.)
Leonard Levy and Gary L. McDowell both advert to the Brutus essays to explain
the origin of No. 78. Leonard Levy, supra note 4, at 6; Gary L. McDowell, Were the AntiFederalists Right? Judicial Activism and the Problem of Consolidated Government, 3
PUBLIUS 103 (1982).
Gary Wills, in his EXPLAINING AMERICA: THE FEDERALIST chs. 14-15 (1981),
claims that Hamilton in No. 78 was, in fact, arguing for legislative supremacy rather than
seeking to confirm the validity of judicial review. This novel interpretation does not appear to have received wider endorsement.
Professor Michael Paulsen's work in the past two decades recognizes the significance
of Brutus' essays in the debate over judicial power at the time of the framing, and their
role in spurring Hamilton to his rebuttal in The Federalist No. 78.
See Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Most Dangerous Branch: Executive Power to Say
What the Law Is, 83 GEO. L.J. 217, 245-52 (1994) (contending that the primary point of
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succeeding numbers) represent merely the other half of a dialogue over the claim that judicial supremacy is inherent under
the Constitution. Moreover, Brutus' views on judicial supremacy
constitute a novel thesis which, to date, have not been sufficiently appreciated in the literature. 7 Hamilton's counterargument (mainly in Federalist Nos. 78 and 81), viewed in the
light of Brutus' thesis, is seen to obfuscate the issue of judicial
supremacy and, in effect, leaves Brutus' thesis unimpaired.
JUDICIAL REVIEW AND NATIONAL CONSOLIDATION
Perhaps the first thing to note is that Brutus did not question the right of the courts to exercise judicial review.
[I]f the legislature pass laws, which, in the judgment of the
court, they are not authorised to do by the constitution, the
court will not take notice of them; for it will not be denied,
that the constitution is the highest or supreme law. And the
courts are vested with the supreme and uncontroulable
power, to determine, in all cases that come before them, what
the constitution means; they cannot, therefore, execute a law,
which, in their judgment, opposes the constitution, unless we
can suppose they can make a superior law give way to an infe•

nor.

8

In acknowledging that judicial review was within the province of the court, Brutus went on to outline the corollary: "[T]he
judgment of the judicial, on the constitution, will become the
rule to guide the legislature in their construction of their powers

Hamilton's argument for judicial review in The Federalist No. 78 is to refute Brutus'
charge of judicial supremacy); Michael Stokes Paulsen, Nixon Now: The Courts and the
Presidency after Twenty-five Years, 83 MINN. L. REV. 1337, 1353-58 (1999) (arguing that
judicial supremacy is contrary to all evidence of original public meaning and citing
Brutus' argument as one that the framers, including Hamilton, were fully aware of and
anxious to repudiate).
7. The identity of Brutus remains a mystery to this day. Most authorities incline to
the view that he was Robert Yates, a judge on the New York Supreme Court, who was
one of three delegates from New York to the 1787 Constitutional Convention. He and
his fellow-delegate, John Lansing, left the Convention after less than a month, on the
grounds that it was exceeding its authority in drafting a new constitution. Their departure
deprived New York of a vote, since the third delegate, Alexander Hamilton, was left
without a quorum. For discussion of the identity of Brutus, see Jeffrey, supra note 6, at
644-46, Diamond, supra note 6, at 252-53, 2 STORING, supra note 6, at 2:358. Corwin assumes, without discussion, that Yates was the author of the Brutus .essays. Cecelia M.
Kenyon makes the same assumption. "The Anti-Federalists," she says, "had no publicist
more able than Robert Yates." CECELIA M. KENYON, THE ANTI-FEDERALISTS 323
(1966).
8. 2 STORING, supra note 6, at 2.9.148.
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[since] the legislature ... will not go over the limits by which the
9
courts may adjudge they are confined."
What concerned Brutus, in the first instance, was the use to
which the court would apply judicial review in the service of national consolidation and how this would threaten the independence and survival of the states. The judicial power, Brutus
warned, would operate to affirm and legitimate all the invasions
of state power committed by the national legislature. "The real
effect of this system of government, will ... be brought home to
the feelings of the people, through the medium of the judicial
power." Therefore, he said, it was
of great importance, to examine with care the nature and extent of the judicial power, because those who are to be vested
with it, are to be placed in a situation altogether unprecedented in a free country. They are to be rendered totally independent, both of the people and the legislature. 10
"Every extension of the power of the general legislature, as
well as of the judicial powers, will increase the powers of the
courts; and the dignity and importance of the judges, will be in
proportion to the extent and magnitude of the powers they exercise."u Thus, "the judicial power will operate to effect, in the
most certain, but yet silent and imperceptible, manner what is
evidently the tendency of the constitution: - I mean, an entire
subversion of the legislative, executive and judicial powers of the
individual states." 12 By legitimating the expansive exercise of
federal power, the courts would be contributing to the aggrandizement of the national government at the expense of the
states. And the institution of a federal system of government,
which presumed a meaningful role for the states in partnership
with the national government, would be seen as a mere sham.
"The opinions of the supreme court, whatever they may be, will
have the force of law; because there is no power provided in the
constitution, that can correct their errors, or controul their adjudications. From this court there is no appeal. " 13 And presumably,
the legislature itself could not set aside a judgment of this court,
he said, "because they are authorized by the constitution to decide in the last resort. The legislature must be controuled by the

9.
10.
11.
12.
13.

!d.
!d.
!d.
!d.
!d.

at 2.9.148-49.
at 2.9.130.
at 2.9.142.
at 2.9.139.
at 2.9.138.
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constitution, and not the constitution by them." 14 Given the
power of the judiciary, it "will enable them to mould the government, into almost any shape they please. " 15
It was important, in Brutus' view, to appreciate that the
court would be free to interpret the constitution, "not only according to its letter, but according to its spirit and intention; and
having this power, they would strongly incline to give it such a
construction as to extend the powers of the general government,
as much as possible, to the diminution, and finally to the destruction, of that of the respective states." 16
The "spirit" of the constitution, Brutus claimed, can best be
deduced from the preamble to the Constitution, which included
the comprehensive term "to provide for the general welfare."
"[I]f the spirit of this system is to be known from its declared end
and design in the preamble, its spirit is to subvert and abolish all
the powers of the state government, and to embrace every object
to which any government extends." 17 This conclusion is confirmed by the powers enumerated in Article 1, Section 8, which
"extend to almost every thing about which any legislative power
can be employed. " 18 And if so, Brutus contended, "nothing can
stand before it" (i.e., the national legislature ). 19 This was particularly so in view of the expansive nature of the necessary and
proper clause which would "undoubtedly be an excellent auxilliary to assist the courts to discover the spirit and reason of the
constitution. "20 As a result, the powers of the government would
extend "to every case, and reduce the state legislatures to nothing. "21 This conclusion emerged from the following analysis:
[T]hese courts will have authority to decide upon the validity
of the laws of any of the states, in all cases where they come in
question before them. Where the constitution gives the general government exclusive jurisdiction, they will adjudge all
laws made by the states, in such cases, void ab initio. Where
the constitution gives them concurrent jurisdiction, the laws of
the United States must prevail, because they are the supreme
law. In such cases, therefore, the laws of the state legislatures
must be repealed, restricted, or so construed, as to give full ef14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.

/d.

Id. at 2.9.144.
/d. at 2.9.145.
/d. at 2.9 .151.
/d. at 2.9 .152.
/d.
/d. at 2.9.153
/d. at 2.9.154.
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feet to the laws of the union on the same subject. ... [I]n proportion as the general government acquires power and jurisdiction, by the liberal construction which the judges may give
the constitution, will those of the states lose its rights, until
they become so trifling and unimportant, as not to be worth
22
h avmg.
0

JUDICIAL SUPREMACY
Beyond assessing the impact of judicial review on the states,
Brutus proceeded to analyze its effect on the national sphere as
well. Here he enunciated in very trenchant-indeed, prescient23 -comments the reason why the Supreme Court would
come to exercise, not only judicial review, but judicial supremacy.
The fundamental principle of ordered government, according to Brutus, is accountability. While separation of powers was
an essential requirement of sound government, accountability,
he insisted, was no less essential an ingredient.
To have a government well administered in all its parts, it is
requisite the different departments of it should be separated
and lodged as much as may be in different hands. The legislative power should be in one body, the executive in another,
and the judicial in one different from either-But still each of
24
these bodies should be accountable for their conduct. •••
When great and extraordinary powers are vested in any
man, or body of men, which in their exercise, may operate to
the oppression of the people, it is of high importance that
powerful checks should be formed to prevent the abuse of
it. . . . [T]he true policy of a republican government is, to
frame it in such manner, that all persons who are concerned in
the government, are made accountable to some superior for

22. !d. at 2.9.158.
23. In his introductory essay, What the Anti-Federalists Were For, in THE
COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST, Herbert Storing writes: "The most farsighted of them,
Brutus, very accurately anticipated the breadth with which the Supreme Court would
construe its own powers and those of the general legislature and the line of reasoning
that would be used." 1 STORING, THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST 50 (Herbert J. Storing ed., 1981). Similarly, Ann Diamond comments: "In the papers on the judiciary ...
Brutus foresees with great accuracy, this history [of the Court], a feat unique to him."
Diamond, supra note 6, at 255.
24. 2 STORING, supra note 6, at 2.9.197. For further comment by Brutus on the principle of the separation of powers, see id. at 2.9.203.
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their conduct in office. -This responsibility should ultimately
25
rest with the People.

With regard to the legislature, Brutus explained, the elected
representatives are chosen by the people at stated periods, and
are therefore amenable to popular control. Inferior courts are
subject to the control of superior courts. "But on this plan we at
last arrive at some supreme, over whom there is no power to
controul but the people themselves. "26 The creation of an institution, which is not accountable at all to any outside body, "is repugnant to the principles of a free government," Brutus
27
warned. "The supreme court under this constitution would be
exalted above all other power in the government, and subject to
no controul. 28 ••• I question whether the world ever saw, in any
period of it, a court of justice invested with such immense powers, and yet placed in a situation so little responsible." 29
In his search for what might have been a suitable means of
instituting accountability for the Supreme Court, Brutus refers
to the precedent of the British judiciary.
The judges in England are under the controul of the leigislature, for they are bound to determine according to the laws
passed by them. But the judges under this constitution will
controul the legislature, for the supreme court are authorised
in the last resort, to determine what is the extent of the powers of the Congress; they are to give the constitution an explanation, and there is no power above them to set aside their
. d gment. 30
JU

If the Framers of the Constitution followed the British
precedent of making the judges independent, they should have
also followed the British constitution "in instituting a tribunal in
which their errors may be corrected." 31 In Britain, the judiciary
was subject to appeals to the House of Lords by means of a writ
of error, and the final disposition of a case was decided by the
32
vote of all the Lords, lay peers no less than judicial. In this
25. !d. at 2.9.197.
26. !d.
27. !d.
28. !d. at 2.9.186.
29. ld.
30. !d. at 2.9.188.
31. !d.
32. See generally, ROBERT STEVENS, LAW AND POLITICS: THE HOUSE OF LORDS
AS A JUDICIAL BODY,1800-1976, at 6-14 (1978); THE OXFORD COMPANION TO LAW 585
(David M. Walker ed., 1980); Thomas Beven, The Appellate Jurisdiction of the House of
Lords, 17 L. Q. REV. 357,365-69 (1901).
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comment, Brutus was referring to the fact that the judges under
the British system were not only bound by the laws of Parliament, but did not operate as the court of last resort. In contrast,
under the Constitution, "the judicial ... have a power which is
above the legislative, and which indeed transcends any power
before given to a judicial by any free government under
heaven." 33 In England, judges had to be made completely independent so as to be undeterred from rendering judgment even
contrary to the wishes of the Crown. There was no such necessity
in the United States and the absolute independence of judges,
without any accountability to any other body, was quite unwarranted. Brutus went on to point out another crucial distinction
between the British and American systems of government-the
ability of Parliament to severely restrict the broader impact of an
unwarranted and inappropriate judicial interpretation of the
constitution-a power entirely lacking to the U.S. Congress.
The supreme court then have a right, independent of the legislature, to give a construction to the constitution and every
part of it, and there is no power provided in this system to
correct their construction or do it away. If, therefore, the legislature pass any laws, inconsistent with the sense the judges
put upon the constitution, they will declare it void; and therefore in this respect their power is superior to that of the legislature. In England the judges are not only subject to have
their decisions set aside by the house of lords, for error, but in
cases where they give an explanation to the laws or constitution of the country, contrary to the sense of the parliament,
though the parliament will not set aside the judgment of the
court, yet, they have authority, by a new law, to explain a
former one, and by this means to prevent a reception of such
decisions. But no such power is in the [U.S.] legislature. The
judges are supreme-and no law, explanatory of the constitu34
tion, will be binding on them.

The end result was that,
(t]here is no power above them to controul any of their decisions. There is no authority that can remove them, and they
cannot be controuled by the laws of the legislature. In short,
they are independent of the people, of the legislature, and of
every power under heaven. Men placed in this situation will
generally soon feel themselves independent of heaven itsele5

33.
34.
35.

2 STORING, supra note 6, at 2.9.188.
!d. at 2.9.193
!d. at 2.9.189. Brutus acknowledged that the election of judges would be "im-
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Brutus dismissed the possibility that impeachment could
serve as a factor to restrain the judiciary. Errors in judgment are
not included under the heading of "high crimes and misdemean36
ors," he explained. Likewise, he was not prepared to put his
faith in the power of Congress under Article 3 of the Constitution to define the scope of the Court's appellate jurisdiction
"with such Exceptions, and under such Regulations" as it may
prescribe. To assume that Congress would "make provision
against all the evils which are apprehended from this article" was
to adopt faulty reasoning. 37
[T[his way of answering the objection made to the power, implies an admission that the power is in itself improper without
restraint, and if so, why not restrict it in the first instance ....
For to answer objections made to a power given to a government, by saying it will never be exercised, is really admitting
that the power ou~ht not to be exercised, and therefore ought
not to be granted.

This court, he reminded his readers, "will be authorized to
decide upon the meaning of the constitution," on the basis of the
natural meaning of the words and "also according to the spirit
and intention" thereof, as conceived by the judges. 39 "In the exercise of this power they will not be subordinate to, but above
the legislature. " 40 His conclusion was that "when this power [of
deciding the meaning of the Constitution] is lodged in the hands
of men independent of the people, and of their representatives,
and who are not, constitutionally, accountable for their opinions,
no way is left to controul them but with a high hand and an out41
stretched arm. "
In sum, what Brutus was enunciating was an entirely original explanation for judicial review, which, he claimed, would
proper." ld.
36. ld. at 2.9.192.
37. !d. at 2.9.185.
38. ld. See also, Brutus' comment on this provision in relation to the question of
jury trial, id. at 2.9.176.
39. !d. at 2.9.193.
40. ld.
41. ld. at 2.9.196 (emphasis in original). At root, of course, Brutus was saying that
judicial supremacy was not in accordance with democratic principles, but democracy, as
such, did not really concern him. What did concern him was the operation of a body endowed with unbridled power, free to reign and dominate, because it was totally unaccountable to any other body, whether it be the electorate or their elected representatives.
On the underlying incompatibility of judicial review with democracy, see BICKEL, supra
note 1, at 18 ("Nothing ... can alter the essential reality that judicial review is a deviant
institution in the American democracy.").

2006]

BRUTUS' NEGLECTED THESIS

17

lead inexorably to judicial supremacy. The essence of republican
government, he contended, was accountability. In drafting the
Constitution, the Framers had been remarkably successful in instituting a system of checks and balances so that no single part of
the national government was free of accountability; there is,
however, one exception, the Supreme Court. The Justices were
not answerable to any body at all. They were at liberty to interpret the Constitution in any way they saw fit, and no part of the
government could qualify or reject their interpretation. Since
they would have the last word, it was their interpretation that
would remain binding on all other sectors of the federal government.42
Various theses have been offered to explain the basis of judicial review. 43 The first was that of Chief Justice Marshall who
found it in the terms of the Constitution itself. The Supremacy
Clause in Article 6 of the Constitution stipulated that only those
laws which were made "pursuant" to the Constitution were
valid. 44 Others, in rejecting the textual basis of judicial review,
found that it was a necessity because of the need for some insti45
tution to umpire the federal system. Still others deemed judicial
46
review an essential appurtenance of a written constitution.
Both of the latter theses would require the court to be quite restrictive in the exercise of judicial review. And there were yet
others, such as Judge Learned Hand, who claimed that judicial
review had no legal basis whatsoever under the Constitution. It
was req~ired only to prevent the "collapse" of the constitutional
system.
Brutus' argument is not that the text of the Constitution
mandates judicial review, or even authorizes it, but that the structure of the Constitution allows for judicial supremacy. Since
42. It was Justice Robert Jackson who coined the immortal aphorism: "We are not
final because we are infallible, but we arc infallible only because we are final." Brown v.
Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 540 (1952) (Jackson, J., dissenting). In similar fashion, Chief Justice
Harlan Fiske Stone wrote: "While unconstitutional exercise of power by the executive
and legislative branches is subject to judicial restraint, the only check upon our own exercise of power is our own sense of self-restraint." U.S. v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 78-79 (1936)
(Stone, J., dissenting).
43. For a review of the various theories, see WALTER F. MURPHY, JAMES E.
FLEMING & WILLIAM F. HARRIS II, AMERICAN CO~STITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION
186-89 (1986).
44. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
45. For discussion of this thesis see BICKEL, supra note I, at ch. 1.
46. See Murphy et al., supra note 43, at 187-188.
47. For discussion of the novel view of Judge Learned Hand, presented during his
delivery of the 1958 Holmes Lectures at Harvard University, see the outstanding biography by GERALD GUNTHER, LEARNED HAND: THE MA~ AND THE 1l:DGE 652-59 (1994).
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there would be nothing to stop the court from declaring that a
law was unconstitutional, it could, with impunity, proceed to do
just that. The court, as it were, would be exercising constitutional
jurisdiction by default. It was a failing of the architects of the
Constitution that they had created a body, such as the Supreme
Court, entirely free of any accountability. Judicial supremacy
was not dictated by the Constitution, it was permitted under the
Constitution because there was no power that could prevent the
institution with the last say, the Supreme Court, from telling the
other branches of government what they were allowed, or not
allowed, to do. In short, Brutus contended, judicial supremacy
was a direct consequence of the failure of the Framers to institute some sort of checks and balances on the Supreme Court as
had been instituted on all other parts of the federal government.
Brutus' charge was clearly a severe remonstrance against
the Framers of the Constitution and demanded a detailed answer if it was not to serve as a rallying point against ratification
of the Constitution. If it was unduly alarmist, there was need to
demonstrate, or at least to give the appearance of demonstrating, that the fears expressed were exaggerated and unwarranted.
This was Hamilton's aim in Federalist No. 78 and the other
numbers that followed.
HAMILTON'S RESPONSE: JUDICIAL REVIEW
AFFIRMED
With reference to Federalist No. 78, it is important to note
that it presents an answer to the question of how to react to federal aggrandizement of power that is very different from the one
provided by Hamilton to the same question earlier in the Federalist Papers. 48 In Federalist No. 33 he had written:
If the Federal Government should overpass the just bounds of
its authority, and make tyrannical use of its powers; the people whose creature it is must appeal to the standard they have
formed, and take such measures to redress the injury done to
the constitution, as the exigency may suggest and prudence
justify ....

[A]cts of the larger society which are not pursuant to its
constitutional powers but which are invasions of the residuary

48.

See CORWIN, supra note 6, at 45.
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authorities of the smaller societies ... will be merely acts of
49
usurpation and will deserve to be treated as such.

There is not a word here about judicial review or the role of
the courts in striking down legislative acts violating the bounds
of national authority. Redress lies with the people alone. Only
after Brutus published his thesis on judicial supremacy did Hamilton proceed to advertise his view that judicial review could
serve as a means of forestalling national encroachment on state
authority. 50 In effect, Hamilton seized on Brutus' argument and,
while denying the cataclysmic consequences Brutus predicted,
adapted the argument to highlight the role of the court as a
1
complete answer to the danger of national aggrandizement. 5
In Federalist Nos. 78 and 81, Hamilton sought to provide a
point-by-point rejoinder to Brutus' charges.
1. The Virtue Of Appointing Judges To Serve "During
Good Behaviour. "

To Hamilton, the Antifederalists' criticism of this term of
office for judges was but a "symptom of the rage for objection
52
which disorders their imaginations and judgments. " This term
of office for members of the judiciary represented, in fact, "one
of the most valuable of the modern improvements in the practice
of government."53 If in a monarchy it was "an excellent barrier to
the despotism of the prince; in a republic it [was] a no less excellent barrier to the encroachments and oppressions of the repre54
sentative body. " Hamilton sought to allay the fears of an activist judiciary. In a government composed of "different
departments of power, ... the judiciary, from the nature of its
functions, will always be the least dangerous [branch] to the political rights of the Constitution." 55 While the executive "holds

49. THE FEDERALIST No. 33 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
50. See CORWIN, supra note 6, at 45-46.
51. In the words of Leonard Levy, Federalist No. 78 "was an attempt to quiet the
fears stimulated by Yates (Brutus]; turning the latter's argument against him." Levy, supra note 4, at 6. And according to William Jeffrey, "Alexander Hamilton, ... was far indeed from uttering freshly-minted and indubitable truths about the power of the Supreme Court to declare the invalidity of congressional statutes. Compelled by the
Constitution's text to acknowledge judicial review, Hamilton was unable to do more than
repeat the assertions of 'Brutus' and attempt to minimize their alarmist impact and dismiss their argumentative force." Jeffrey, supra note 6, at 655.
52. THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
53. !d.
54. !d.
55. !d.
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the sword of the community," and the legislature "commands
the purse," the judiciary has "no influence" over either the
sword or purse, and "can take no active resolution whatever." 56
Having "neither FORCE nor WILL, but merely judgment," it
was dependent on "the aid of the executive arm even for the efficacy of its judgments." 57 "Permanency in office," said Hamilton, is vital to its "firmness and independence," to enable it to
pronounce "all acts contrary to the manifest tenor of the Constitution void." 58 Under a limited constitution, where certain actions are proscribed, if the court were not to have this power "all
the reservations of particular rights or privileges [enumerated]
59
would amount to nothing. "
Of course, Brutus had stated that he could not conceive of
any alternative to judges serving for life. "I do not object to the
judges holding their commissions during good behaviour. I suppose it a proper provision provided they were made properly responsible. "60 However, granting the judges the power, as Hamilton would have it, to pronounce acts contrary to the "manifest
tenor" of the Constitution void, was to grant them supremacy.
No greater power exists in one person over another than the authority to make the second person's act null and void, so that the
will of the first predominates. This absolute veto power in the
judiciary imparted unlimited dominance over the other two
branches, and Hamilton's references to the power of the purse
or the sword were mere platitudes, since of what use are these
"active" powers if they cannot be exercised except with the consent of the Court? Absent restrictions on the judges' unbridled
freedom of action, there was no reason why they should not dictate to, and completely dominate, the other branches of government. To this, Hamilton took exception.

2. Judicial Review Does Not Mean Judicial Supremacy.
Declaring the acts of another branch of government void,
said Hamilton, does not mean that the one making the pronouncement is necessarily supreme. It does not suppose "a supe61
riority of the judicial to the legislative power. " Since a constitution emanating from the people "is, in fact, and must be
56. !d.
57. !d.
58. !d.
59. !d.
60. 2 STORING, supra note 6, at 2.9.189.
61. THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
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regarded by the judges, as a fundamental law" if there is "an irreconcileable variance" between the act of the legislature and
the constitution, the judges have no choice but to prefer the constitution to the statute, "the intention of the people to the intention of their agents. " 62
This argument was mere casuistry on Hamilton's part, for
several reasons. For one thing, what makes the judges more
faithfully representative of the people than the elected "agents"
of the people? If the latter consider their action to be consistent
with the Constitution, from whence do the judges derive superior title to be "acting on behalf of the people" and declare it inconsistent? Indeed, the legislative "agents" are accountable to
the people for their decisions, while the judges are not. So why
should one assume that the determination of the judges is more
authoritative and faithful to "the intention of the people" than
that of their elected representatives? 63 Above all, what would
prevent the judges from asserting that there was a contradiction
between a statute and the Constitution, when on the face of the
statute no such contradiction was apparent? Moreover, granting
the judges the last word was subversive of the basic principle of
republican government since it removes from the people, the ultimate judges, the right and the power to react and to rectify
what they regard as a misreading of the constitution.
All of this had appeared in the final paragraph of Brutus'
essay No. 15 dealing with the judiciary. 64
Had the construction of the constitution been left with the
legislature, they would have explained it at their peril; if they
exceed their powers, or sought to find, in the spirit of the constitution, more than was expressed in the letter, the people
from whom they derived their power could remove them, and
do themselves right; ... A constitution is a compact of a people with their rulers; if the rulers break the compact, the people have a right and ought to remove them and do themselves
justice; but in order to enable them to do this with the greater
facility, those whom the people chuse at stated periods,
should have the power in the last resort to determine the
sense of the compact; if they determine contrary to the understanding of the people, an appeal will lie to the people at the
62. !d.
63. Bickel also presents a similar line of argument. BICKEL, supra note 1, at 4--5.
And in the words of Ann Diamond, "Hamilton paints a picture of a court which is not
only compatible with a representative democracy, but the essence of it; a court more democratic than the elected representatives of the people." Diamond, supra note 6, at 278.
64. 2 STORING, supra note 6, at 2.9.196.
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period when the rulers are to be elected, and they will have it
in their power to remedy the evil; but when this power is
lodged in the hands of men independent of the people, and of
their representatives, and who are not, constitutionally, accountable for their opinions, no way is left to controul them
65
but with a high hand and an outstretched arm.

Furthermore, according to Brutus, it was vain to claim that
declaring the acts of Congress void did not signify judicial superiority; in fact, that organ of government qualified to pronounce
the last word exercises dominance. "[T]he judges under this constitution will controul the legislature, for the supreme court are
authorised in the last resort, to determine what is the extent of
the powers of Congress; they are to give the constitution an explanation, and there is no power above them to set aside their
66
judgment. " In reaction to this, Hamilton declares: "It can be of
no weight to say that the courts, on the pretence of a repugnancy, may substitute their own pleasure to the constitutional intentions of the legislature .... The courts must declare the sense
of the law; and if they should be disposed to exercise WILL instead of JUDGMENT, the consequence would equally be the
67
substitution of their pleasure to that of the legislative body."
This, he says, would only go to show that there should be no
68
judges "distinct" from the legislature. Hamilton himself, however, offers no suggestion on how to forestall judges exercising
WILL instead of JUDGMENT.
3 . Judicial Review as a Shield.
Hamilton sought to demonstrate that judicial review would
serve to protect two exposed groups. The courts, he said, would
operate "as the bulwarks of a limited constitution against legislative encroachments." 69 Hamilton attempted thereby to reassure
the states that the federal judiciary, far from being a threat to
their sovereignty, as Brutus would have it, would act as their
guardian in striking down every national attempt to encroach on
state prerogatives. A second exposed group was that of minorities, and here, once again, the exercise of judicial review would
operate to protect "the rights of individuals from the effects of
those ill humours, which the arts of designing men, or the influ65.
66.
67.
68.
69.

/d. (emphasis in original).
!d. at 2.9.188.
THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
/d.
/d.
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ence of particular conjunctures, sometimes disseminate among
the people themselves, and which, ... occasion dangerous innovations in the government, and serious oppressions of the minor
party in the community." 70
Judicial independence was vital if the courts were to act
against the legislative will in defending the rights of the states
and of individuals. "It would require an uncommon portion of
fortitude in the judges to do their duty as faithful guardians of
the constitution, where legislative invasions of it had been instigated by the major voice of the community." 71 Judicial independence required permanency of appointment. "Inflexible and
uniform adherence to the rights of the [states under the] Constitution and of individuals" could not be expected "from judges
who hold their offices by a temporary commission." 72
But, of course, Brutus had all along acknowledged that appointment during good behaviour was essential if judges were to
enjoy that security and independence that would enable them to
judge fairly and without fear of recrimination. This was not at issue. By raising the matter of tenure of office, Hamilton was raising a straw man to knock down and score points. Permanency in
office did not preclude the judges from dominating the legislature or executive and dictating to these branches of government
which policies could stand and which could not. Judicial independence, Brutus maintained, was vital, but it did not entail the
right of judicial domination. The distinction between judicial review and judicial supremacy was clear. While the former allowed, and even required, that the court strike down any law
that was manifestly contrary to the express provisions of the
Constitution, it did not empower the court to assert the unconstitutionality of a law on the basis of a narrow and particularly subtle interpretation of the relevant constitutional provision. As
Corwin has said:
It is fairly evident that the Philadelphia Convention intended
to provide ... a method for enforcing the direct prohibitions
of the Constitution on Congress; but by the same token, there
was originally a clear logical implication against judicial re73
view of broader range.
70. /d.
71. /d.
72. /d.
73. CORWIN, supra note 6, at 81. And Corwin adds: "In Marbury v. Madison unlimited judicial review was clearly asserted." !d. This, of course, was the great novelty of
Marbury v. Madison-that the Court was competent to rule on matters of interpretation,
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In effect, Hamilton took Brutus' charge that the exercise of
judicial review by the Supreme Court would inevitably lead to
the emasculation of the states and the consolidation of the country under one central government and cited judicial review as the
best guarantee against national encroachment on state authority.
He skillfully turned the tables on Brutus by brandishing judicial
review as a foil against national aggrandizement, while conveniently forgetting that it could also serve to strike down state intrusions on national sovereignty. Only in Federalist No. 80 did
he advert to this power over state legislation, but illustrated it
solely with reference to such clear-cut prohibitions as the imposition of duties on imported articles and the issuance of paper
money. Of necessity, he said, the federal courts would have to be
empowered "to over-rule such as might be in manifest contra74
vention of the articles of union. " Implicitly, Hamilton was suggesting that anything less than a "manifest contravention" of the
Constitution would not encounter judicial disallowance. (The
latter role would, of course, be precisely the nemesis of state authority to which Brutus referred.) At the same time, Hamilton
sidestepped the central charge of Brutus that the Constitution,
by allowing the judges to interpret the Constitution according to
its "spirit," effectively conferred on them absolute sovereignty to
tell the other branches of the national government what the
Constitution permitted and what it did not. In No. 78, Hamilton
simply declared that no one could suspect that the courts would
attempt to impose their will on the co-ordinate branches of government, but did not explain why they would not. That analysis
he left for No. 81.
4. Judicial Supremacy Denied.
Hamilton opened his discussion with a long extract, a sort of
precis, of the Antifederalist argument-i.e., that of Brutus:
The authority of the proposed supreme court of the United
States, which is to be a separate and independent body, will
be superior to that of the legislature. The power of construing
the laws according to the spirit of the constitution, will enable
that court to mould them into whatever shape it may think
whether in statutes or constitutional provisions, and not merely on explicit Congressional
violations of the Constitution. As expressed by Bickel: "Marshall knew (and, indeed, it
was true in this very case) that a statute's repugnancy to the Constitution is in most instances not self-evident; it is, rather, an issue of policy that someone must decide. The
problem is who." BICKEL, supra note 1, at 3.
74. THE FEDERALIST No. 80 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
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proper; especially as its decisions will not be in any manner
subject to the revision or correction of the legislative body.
This is as unprecedented as it is dangerous. In Britain, the judicial power, in the last resort, resides in the house of lords,
which is a branch of the legislature; and this part of the British
government has been imitated in the State constitutions in
general. The parliament of Great-Britain, and the legislatures
of the several States, can at any time rectify, by law, the exceptionable decisions of their respective courts. But the errors
and usurpations of the supreme court of the United States will
75
be uncontrolable and remediless.

In dismissing this conclusion, Hamilton asserted that the argument "will be found to be altogether made up of false reasoning
76
upon misconceived fact."

5. Judicial Review Limited to Explicit Violations.
"In the first place," said Hamilton, "there is not a syllable in
the plan under consideration, which directly empowers the national courts to construe the laws according to the spirit of the
constitution, or which gives them any greater latitude in this respect than may be claimed by the courts of every state. "77 Of
course, Brutus had never said that the Constitution explicitly authorizes the judges to interpret the Constitution according to its
spirit. It was sufficient that this power was nowhere denied.

6. Unsuitability of Judiciary as Part of Legislature.
Perhaps, said Hamilton, the Antifederalist complaint is directed to the fact that the Supreme Court was constituted as a
separate body rather than "being one of the branches of the legislature, as in the government of Great Britain and that of the
State [of New York]." 78 In Britain, of course, members of the
House of Lords, lay peers no less than law lords, were empowered to rule on an appeal from a lower court and to void the decision. And Article 32 of the 1777 New York constitution provided for appeals "for correction of errors" to be heard by a
75. !d. This precis, drawn from the very words of Brutus, make it absolutely clear
that Publius Nos. 78-81 were composed as a response to Brutus' essays on the judiciary.
In light of this fact, the comment in Benjamin Wright's 1942 study, THE GROWTH OF
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw, supra note 4 at 22, that it was "probably" in answer
to Brutus' argument, seems out of place.
76. THE FEDERALIST No. 81 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
77. ld.
78. !d.
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court composed of "the president of the senate, ... the senators,
chancellor, and judges of the supreme court, or the major part of
them," but denying the judges "a voice for ... affirmance or reversal" of their earlier decision. Here Hamilton was finally addressing Brutus' primary complaint, that the national judiciary
was totally free of accountability, in contrast to the way appeals
were handled in Great Britain, for instance. The case of New
York had not been mentioned by Brutus, but anyone familiar
with the status of the judiciary there was undoubtedly aware that
it paralleled the British example in conferring on the legislature-or on part of it-supervisory authority over the judiciary.
In both instances, while the judges were free to express their
views in matters of appeal, the final decision did not rest with the
judges alone, but with the representatives of the people who
were ultimately accountable to the electorate. 79
In response, Hamilton argued that locating the judiciary
within the legislature would come close to violating, at least partially, the separation of powers principle that was regarded by
the Antifederalists as sacrosanct. It would also place the judiciary in a body marked by faction and politics, a most unsuitable
setting for judicial determination. Moreover, it was even a
"greater absurdity" to suggest that men "deficient" in knowledge
of the law should be allowed to revise decisions reached by men
expert in the law. All these considerations, said Hamilton, undoubtedly influenced most of the other states, other than New
York, to commit the judicial power not to a part of their legislatures, but to a distinct and separate body. 80 And in any case, the
79. Id. It might sound incongruous today to hear that an appeal could be carried
from the state's highest court to a non-judicial body. But New York was not alone in
making provision for such appeals. New Jersey and Connecticut also provided for writs
of error from the highest court in the state to non-judicial bodies. And, of course, the
U.S. Senate serves as a tribunal to judge charges of impeachment. In Britain, thanks to
parliamentary sovereignty, Parliament is, even today, free to nullify or revise judicial interpretations of the British constitution or of a statute. This, of course, is different from
reversing the decision in a given case, but in terms of revising the legal principle involved,
it is the same.
It is also important to recognize that this issue is quite distinct from the question that
arose in Hayburn's Case. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 408,409 (1792). In that case, it will be recalled,
the justices of the Supreme Court refused to serve as commissioners to assess pension
claims by veterans since the Secretary of War would have the final say in ruling on the
application. This arrangement, the justices argued, confirmed that their ruling would be
an administrative, rather than a judicial one. For discussion of Hayburn's Case, see S.
SLONIM, FRAMERS' CONSTRUCfiON/BEARDIAN DECONSTRUCf!ON: ESSAYS ON THE
CONSTITUTIO:-IAL DESIGN OF 1787 at 157--61 (2001).
80. See generally, History of the Supreme Court of Judicature, 1691-1847, in
"DUELY & COl'STANTLY KEPT": A HISTORY OF THE NEW YORK SUPREME COURT,
1691-1847, at 2-10 (1991).
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national legislature will be as free as the legislatures of these
states to enact fresh laws to modify the decision of the court in
future cases. Needless to say, none of these answers effectively
dealt with Brutus' fundamental complaint that the authors of the
Constitution had unwittingly created an institution which, in
contrast to all other institutions under the Constitution, was totally free of checks and balances-and free, that is, of the basic
requirement of any ordered system of government: accountability.
7. The Threat of Impeachment.

Finally, Hamilton contended, "the supposed danger of judiciary encroachments on the legislative authority, which has been
upon many occasions reiterated, is in reality a phantom. "81 Occasional "misconstructions and contraventions of the will of the
legislature may now and then happen," but these would not be
serious or drastically "affect the order of the political system." 82
This could be inferred, Hamilton said, "from the general nature
of the judicial power; from the objects to which it relates; from
the manner in which it is exercised; from its comparative weakness, and from its total incapacity to support its usurpations by
force." 83 And such an inference is "greatly fortified" by the "important constitutional check," which Congress could institute
against the judges through impeachment. 84
This is alone a complete security. There never can be danger
that the judges, by a series of deliberate usurpations on the
authority of the legislature, would hazard the united resentment of the body entrusted with it, while this body was possessed of the means of punishin? their presumption, by de8
grading them from their stations.

Thus, in short, Hamilton rejected Brutus' argument regarding
judicial supremacy by asserting, first of all, that the inherent
weakness of the judiciary would ensure that it would not exercise
a free-wheeling interpretation of the Constitution contrary to the
wishes of Congress, and secondly, that the threat of impeach-

81.

THE FEDERALIST No. 81 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke cd., 1961).

82.

/d.
/d.
/d.
/d.

83.
84.

85.
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ment would serve as "a complete security" against the danger of
judicial aggrandizement of authority. 86
As noted earlier, Brutus had dismissed the threat of impeachment as an inhibiting factor against judicial supremacy.
Nor is it necessary to refer to judicial history to demonstrate that
all the other so-called "safeguards" adduced by Hamilton would
be quite insufficient to restrain a judiciary bent on exercising judicial supremacy. Brutus had discounted in advance each of
these so-called safeguards and had established quite clearly that,
if the judges wished, the road to judicial supremacy was wide
open to them. Hamilton's attempt, therefore, in Federalist Nos.
78 and 81, to rebut Brutus' conclusions on the danger of judicial
supremacy constituted, in the final analysis, an abject failure.
Brutus' thesis represented, and represents, a powerful indictment of the handiwork of the Framers, who unwittingly created
one organ of government totally free of any checks and balances,
despite the fact that this principle was supposed to be a mainstay
of the republican system of government they were establishing.
In the absence of any requirement of accountability, that organ
of government was free to assert the right to "rule the roost" and
exercise judicial supremacy.
It is noteworthy that Madison recognized this fact only belatedly, when the Constitution was already ratified and about to
be implemented. 87 At the Constitutional Convention, Madison
86. It is interesting to observe that Publius did not refer to the power of Congress
under Article 3 of the Constitution to define the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court, "with such exceptions, and under such Regulations as the Congress shall make,"
as a means of preventing judicial abuse of the power of judicial review. See Brutus' dismissal of such an argument in 2 STORING, supra note 6, at 2.9.176. Hamilton does refer to
this provision at the end of Federalist No. 81, in answer to the charge that the Supreme
Court would be empowered to revise jury determinations of fact. Perhaps he regarded
congressional authority under the provision to define the scope of appellate jurisdiction
as referring strictly to procedural, not substantive, matters. This issue, of course, arose
directly in the Reconstruction case of Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (1 Wall.) 506 (1868).
87. It is not clear that Madison saw Brutus' comments on the subject of judicial supremacy, or that they stimulated his thoughts on the subject. However, a personal letter
to him by Alexander White, dated August 16, 1788, two months before his Observations
on Jefferson's Draft, may have alerted him to the implications. ROBERT A. RUTLAND ET
AL., THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 11:233 (1977). White was reacting to a protest by
the judges of the Virginia Court of Appeals against the new district court law, on the
ground that it might be said to conflict with the Virginia constitution. He objected to the
judges' assumption that "the Constitution is paramount (to] the Ordinary Legislature."
Id. "It is possible," he wrote, "that wise and good men may differ in the construction of
some parts of it." /d.
The Assembly may pass an Act which they conceive perfectly consistent with
the Constitution, the Judges may determine it inconsistent. Who is to decide the
Contest? If the Judges opinion is to prevail, it places them above the Law, establishes an Oligarchy, vests absolute power in 15 men who hold their places
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had proposed that the national legislature serve as the umpire of
the federal system. He advocated arming that body with a veto
over all state legislation. 88 Initially, the Convention accepted his
proposal for a congressional veto over unconstitutional state legislation. With Congress acting as a constitutional court, the road
to judicial review and supremacy would appear to have been
largely foreclosed. Subsequently, however, the Convention rejected Madison's legislative veto entirely, and implicitly made
89
the judiciary the umpire of the federal system. This opened the
door to judicial review of federal legislation generally, and
hence, judicial supremacy. Madison was chagrined at the refusal
90
of the Convention to adopt his legislative veto proposal. His
dismay over the prospect of judicial supremacy is reflected in his
1788 Observations on Jefferson's Draft Constitution for Vir91
ginia, in which he wrote as follows:
In the State Constitutions & indeed in the Fed!. one also, no
provision is made for the case of a disagreement in expounding them; and as the Courts are generally the last in making
their decision, it results to them, by refusing or not refusing to
execute a law, to stamp it with its final character. This makes

during life, and over whom the People have no controul. Much safer may it be
left to the Assembly-they are the immediate representatives of the People,
and should they pass an Act inconsistent with the principles of the Constitution
in the oppinion of the Community at large, the Members concurring in the Act
would be displaced at the next election, and evil removed in the course of a
year .... It is their duty to expound the Laws and to give Judgement according
to their true sense and meaning-but that they should have a right to execute or
not to execute at their Will and Pleast.re a clear express Statute, is I believe a
novelty in Politicks, the consequences of which may not be easily foreseen.
ld. at 11:233.
88. See Charles F. Hobson, The Negative on State Laws: James Madison, the Constitution, and the Crisis of Republican Government, 36 WM. & MARY Q. 215 (1979). This
article is one of the most important pieces to appear on the founding.
89. See SLONIM, supra note 79, at 256.
90. In a lengthy letter to Jefferson on October 24, 1787, Madison expressed the fear
that the Constitution would be a failure. See id. at 116-17.
91. Papers of lames Madison, 11:293. For a discussion of Madison's views on judicial review, see Ralph Ketcham, James Madison and Judicial Review, 8 SYRACUSE L.
REV. 158 (1956-57), and Editorial Comment in 11 PJM 284-85.
Significantly, even after the passage of some thirty years, Madison was still not reconciled to judicial review of federal legislation. In a letter to President James Monroe in
1817, he recalled "the attempts in the Convention to vest in the Judiciary Department a
qualified negative on Legislative bills." Such a control, restricted to Constitutional points,
besides giving greater stability and system to the rules of expounding the Instrument,
"would have precluded the question of a judiciary annulment of Legislative acts." Letters
and other Writings of lames Madison, vol. 3, p. 56 (N.Y.: Worthington, 1884) (cited by
THORNTON ANDERSON, CREATING THE CO:->STITUTIO!\' 141 n.22 (1993)).

30

CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY

[Vol. 23:7

the Judiciary Dept paramount in fact to the Legislature,
which was never intended, and can never be proper. 92

He proposed that in each of these governments, after an intervening election, a super-majority of both houses of the legislature (two-thirds or three-fourths) be qualified to override an executive or judicial veto. "It sd. not be allowed the Judges or the
Ex [ecutive] to pronounce a law thus enacted, unconstitul. & invalid," declared Madison. In the words of one prominent writer:
"Madison's cardinal tenet was that unchecked power in human
hands was liable to abuse, and hence [that) that government was
'least imperfect' which kept a check on all exercise of power and
93
authority." In relation to the Court, Madison, of course, never
pursued this thought and nothing came of his proposal for reigning in the judiciary.
CONCLUSIONS
Federalist No. 78, which appeared even before the Constitution was ratified and entered into force, is well known as an early
exposition of, and justification for, judicial review. What is less
well known is that this essay by Hamilton represented a rejoinder to the contention of the Antifederalist essayist Brutus that
the Constitution furnished the basis, not only for judicial review,
but also for judicial supremacy. Sound government, Brutus had
written, required that the three branches of government be both
separated and accountable. Yet the Constitution, while it provided for checks and balances in relation to the legislature and
executive, imposed no restraints on the Supreme Court. Once
the tribunal was seized of a case, it would be free to rule as it
chose and was accountable to no outside source. Since its voice
would be the last pronouncement in the process of legislation, its

92. Strangely enough, this comment did not prevent Madison some six months
later, on June 8, 1789, from suggesting that the judiciary would act as a guardian of a bill
of rights. In presenting a draft list of amendments to Congress, he said:
If they are incorporated into the Constitution, independent tribunals of justice
will consider themselves in a peculiar manner the guardians of those rights, they
will be an impenetrable bulwark against every assumption of power in the legislative or executive; they will be naturally led to resist every encroachment upon
rights expressly stipulated for in the constitution by the declaration of rights.
Papers of James Madison, 12:206--D7.
The seeming contradiction might be cleared up if one assumes that Madison was referring here to the state level only. Alternatively, perhaps he accepted a role for the
courts in protecting rights, but not in determining the scope of federal power in nationalstate affairs.
93. Ketcham, supra note 91, at 158.
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ruling would effectively bind the other two branches. Government policy would thus be largely determined by an unelected
body. Hamilton's attempt to deny Brutus's charge that the Constitution gave license to judicial supremacy is seen, upon analysis, to be quite unpersuasive. James Madison, Father of the Constitution, belatedly came to realize, and regret, the manner in
which an unfettered court could exercise domination over the
other two branches of the federal government. Under Madison's
original constitutional scheme, the national legislature would
serve as the umpire of the federal system, and the court's role
would have been restricted. There would thus have been little
room for judicial review of federal legislation, much less for judicial supremacy. But the Convention rejected his proposal for a
legislative veto over state legislation, and, as a result, the court
was ensconced as the umpire of the federal system. Therewith,
judicial review, and with it, judicial supremacy, wereunwittingly perhaps-instituted under the U.S. Constitution.

